One finance executive in Maersk’s Ukraine office asked IT to install accounting software on a single computer. The shipping group spent the next weeks rebuilding its network. Two logistics cybersecurity incidents come with public price tags: Maersk’s in 2017 and Expeditors’ in 2022. In August 2017, A.P. Moller-Maersk said it expected NotPetya to hit its results by USD 200-300 million. Expeditors’ 2022 shutdown had cost it about $60 million in expenses so far, Sourcing Journal reported from the company’s May update, and about $40 million of that was demurrage. In Maersk’s case the sources document warnings about the network that were not acted on. The Expeditors releases give a figure for the damage but name no cause.
A finance request in Odessa
A finance executive in Maersk’s Ukraine operation asked IT administrators to install the accounting software M.E.Doc on it, according to WIRED’s reconstruction of the attack. The update servers of the company behind M.E.Doc had been hijacked in the spring of 2017. The malware combined EternalBlue, an exploit leaked from the US National Security Agency, with Mimikatz, a tool that pulls passwords out of a computer’s memory and tries them on other machines.
From that one branch machine the outage went global, and the 2016 warnings suggest weak network segmentation played a part. WIRED reports that some Maersk servers were still running Windows 2000, and that in 2016 a group of IT executives had warned about patching, outdated operating systems and above all insufficient network segmentation, which could let malware spread beyond its first machine “exactly as NotPetya would the next year.” The redesign was budgeted but never carried forward. Maersk’s own statement after the attack called it a previously unseen type of malware and said updates and patches applied to Windows and antivirus were not an effective protection in this case. WIRED notes that Microsoft had already patched the flaw EternalBlue used, and that Mimikatz let the malware take passwords from unpatched machines and use them on patched ones.
The backup that survived because of a blackout
Maersk’s IT staff found backups of almost all individual servers, dated three to seven days before the attack. The missing piece was the domain controllers, the servers that decide which users may reach which systems. Maersk ran about 150 of them, synced to each other, so any one could in theory restore the rest. NotPetya wiped all of them except one.
That one sat in a remote office in Ghana. A power outage had knocked it offline before the malware arrived. Its link was too thin to send several hundred gigabytes, so the drive travelled by hand: a Ghanaian employee flew to Nigeria, passed it to a colleague, and the colleague took the flight to Heathrow, where a recovery team was working in Maidenhead.
Meanwhile staff taped paper documents to containers at APM ports and took bookings through personal Gmail accounts, WhatsApp and Excel. CNBC reports that Maersk said Maersk Line was able to take bookings from existing customers two days after the attack and that things gradually got back to normal over the following week. WIRED describes a later milestone: orders for new shipments through Maerskline.com, which started only after several days. The two accounts can both hold: CNBC speaks of existing customers, WIRED of new shipments. WIRED also says it was more than a week before terminals worked with any normalcy, and some staff worked day and night for close to two months. Maersk’s chairman said the company rebuilt 4,000 servers and 45,000 PCs in 10 days, while WIRED notes that full recovery took far longer. WIRED adds that Maersk’s chairman put the cost at $250-300 million in a later Davos talk, a little above the first forecast.
Expeditors: eight days to the first sign of recovery, about three weeks of limits
On February 20, 2022, Expeditors announced a targeted cyber-attack and said it had shut down most of its operating systems globally. While they were off, its ability to arrange freight shipments or manage customs and distribution for customers would be limited.
Sourcing Journal, summarizing the company’s May update, put the expenses at about $60 million so far. The CFO said the bulk of the expenses were behind the company, with more to come for system enhancements. That figure covers expenses only, not lost volume or revenue, so it is not directly comparable with Maersk’s USD 200-300 million forecast of the hit to results. Around $40 million was accrued demurrage from the slowdown in processing port shipments. Roughly $20 million went to recovery, investigation and claims over shipment issues. The company reported the start of a return to normal on February 28. In its first-quarter 2022 release, airfreight tonnage fell 18 percent and ocean container volume 3 percent against the same quarter of 2021, which the company said was principally a result of the attack. The same release says the attack limited the company’s ability to arrange shipments, manage customs and distribution, or perform certain accounting functions for approximately three weeks. CEO Jeffrey Musser said all of Expeditors’ products suffered, particularly during the first three weeks.
Demurrage was the biggest line, and Expeditors’ own release describes it as incremental demurrage charges for which the company had direct liability. For a shipper, the practical lesson is to keep a source of container status that does not run through one forwarder’s systems. Entering the container number into container tracking gives status, route and ETA from the carrier side across 240+ ocean lines.
What a shipper can check in a partner’s setup
After the attack, Maersk’s IT staff told WIRED, multifactor authentication was rolled out across the company. CISA’s October 2022 fact sheet says the agency has consistently urged organizations to implement MFA for all users and for all services, including email, file sharing and financial account access, and warns that some forms can be beaten by phishing or push bombing.
M.E.Doc was supplier software installed at one branch. That is the category NIST SP 800-161 Rev. 1 addresses: identifying, assessing and mitigating cybersecurity risks in the supply chain, including the products and services an organization acquires.
Maersk’s rebuild leaned on one domain controller that was offline when the malware arrived. WIRED describes the drive holding its data as the keystone of the entire recovery. A logistics cybersecurity review of a forwarder can start with exactly this: where its copy of the identity servers sits, and whether it survives when the live network goes down.
Frequently asked questions
Which weaker forms of MFA does CISA warn about?
CISA names SS7 exploitation and SIM swap attacks among the ways some forms of MFA can be beaten, alongside phishing and push bombing. Its October 2022 fact sheet calls phishing-resistant MFA the gold standard and asks organizations to treat the move to it as a high priority.
Did Maersk lose third-party data in the NotPetya attack?
No third-party data, Maersk said in August 2017.
Did Expeditors keep its customers after the 2022 attack?
Its CEO, Jeffrey Musser, said the company retained the vast majority of customers. That is the company's own statement, and no customer-loss figure appears in the coverage we cite.
